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DEFYING “COMMON SENSE?”: THE
LEGITIMACY OF APPLYING TITLE VII TO
EMPLOYER CRIMINAL RECORDS POLICIES
Tammy R. Pettinato*
Many ex-offenders1 face steep odds when searching for employment.2
Policies banning or restricting employment opportunities for those with crimi-
nal records are widespread in both the public and private sectors.3 Furthermore,
the number of employers checking criminal backgrounds is growing.4 Given
the disproportionate number of African American and Hispanic men with crim-
inal records,5 such policies naturally lead to a disproportionate number of these
men facing severely limited employment prospects.
At first glance, this situation presents a classic case of “not my problem.”
Ex-offenders are unlikely to garner much sympathy from either politicians or
the public because, unlike people who are discriminated against due to race or
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.
1 In this article, I use the term ex-offenders to refer to people with any kind of criminal
record, from convicted felons to those who have an arrest record but no convictions. It
should be noted that these groups often face separate challenges; however, a detailed break-
down of the differences is beyond the scope of this article, and, in any event, some employ-
ers do not differentiate between the groups.
2 Prior to the current recession, between 25 percent and 40 percent of ex-offenders were
unemployed. Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination
Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 3
(2012).
3 Most states either ban or restrict public employment of convicted felons. Many states also
restrict certain ex-offenders from obtaining a wide variety of occupational licenses, and a
majority of states allow both public and private employers to consider arrest records.
Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second Chances”:
Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-Offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527,
536 (2006). Many private employers have expressed an unwillingness to hire employees
with any sort of criminal record. Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Ex-Offenders?:
Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants 6–7 (Inst. for Research
on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 1243-02, 2002), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/pub
lications/dps/pdfs/dp124302.pdf.
4 In 1996, 51 percent of employers conducted criminal background checks; by 2010, that
percentage had risen to 92 percent. Roberto Concepcio´n, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial
Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL’Y 231, 237 (2012).
5 Approximately two-thirds of inmates in the United States are African-American or Latino.
See Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 13
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 284 (2006). One-third of African American men and
one-sixth of Hispanic men are projected to be incarcerated during their lifetimes. THOMAS P.
BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRIS-
ONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974-2001, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf.
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sex, they “made their own mess.” Some people may argue that a lack of
employment opportunities for ex-offenders is a justifiable consequence of their
criminal behavior.
While such views are understandable, they ignore the severe impact that
ex-offender unemployment has on society. Studies show that unemployment is
a chief contributing factor in recidivism.6 Furthermore, the racial disparity in
the ex-offender population means that this particular unemployment problem
has a disparate and devastating impact on African American and Hispanic com-
munities. And from a moral perspective, it seems fundamentally unjust to con-
tinue punishing people after they have “paid their debt to society.”
The EEOC has long recognized these problems and has consistently held
the view that employer criminal records policies may violate Title VII if they
have a disparate impact on protected classes and are not “job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.”7 To that end, on
April 25, 2012, the EEOC issued new enforcement guidelines for how employ-
ers may use criminal records in their hiring processes without violating Title
VII.8 The guidelines consolidated and updated previous guidelines and called
for a lesser reliance on bright-line exclusionary policies in favor of more indi-
vidualized assessment of applicants and employees.9 Since that time, the EEOC
has followed up, filing several lawsuits against employers for practices deemed
to violate the guidelines.10
In spite of the fact that the new guidelines merely re-affirm past policies,
they have elicited strong reaction, mostly negative, from both the public and the
legal community alike.11 Perhaps the strongest reaction came from a group of
6 See Simonson, supra note 5. See also Archer & Williams, supra note 3, at 529–30.
7 See, e.g., EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
at 8 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDELINES], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/gui
dance/arrest_conviction.cfm; EEOC Policy Statement on the Issue of Conviction Records
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(1982): Conviction Records, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMMISSION (Feb. 4, 1987), http://
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html (“[T]he Commission’s underlying position [is]
that an employer’s policy or practice of excluding individuals from employment on the basis
of their conviction records has an adverse impact on Blacks and Hispanics in light of statis-
tics showing that they are convicted at a rate disproportionately greater than their representa-
tion in the population.”).
8 See generally EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
9 Id. at 18.
10 On June 11, 2013, the EEOC filed suit against Dollar General Corporation and BMW,
both alleging that company policies regarding criminal background checks caused a dispa-
rate impact against African-Americans. See Complaint at 1–2, EEOC v. Dolgencorp LLC,
No. 1:13-cv-04307 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2013); Complaint at 1, EEOC v. BMW Mfg. Co., No.
7:13-cv-01583 (D.S.C. June 11, 2013).
11 See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, No. 09cv2573, 2013 WL 4464553, *18 (D. Md. Aug. 9,
2013) (“By bringing actions of this nature, the EEOC has placed many employers in the
‘Hobson’s choice’ of ignoring criminal history and credit background, thus exposing them-
selves to potential liability for criminal and fraudulent acts committed by employees, on the
one hand, or incurring the wrath of the EEOC for having utilized information deemed funda-
mental by most employers.”). See also Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1,
11, 15, 17, Texas v. EEOC, No. 5:13-cv-00255-C (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2013) (alleging that the
new guidelines interfere with state sovereignty); James Bovard, Perform Criminal Back-
ground Checks at Your Peril, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2013, at A15, available at http://online
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nine state attorneys general who, in a July 2013 letter to the EEOC (“Attorneys
General Letter”), accused the agency of “gross federal overreach.”12 The letter
makes several arguments for why the EEOC’s new enforcement policy is mis-
guided and also suggests in several places that the guidelines are a misuse of
power. The underlying implication of the arguments is that protecting ex-
offenders from discrimination is an illegitimate expansion of Title VII. Because
the letter represents a collection of critiques likely to be leveled against the
EEOC in future litigation and scholarship, it deserves a close examination. In
this article, I address each of the attorneys general’s arguments in turn and
show both why the arguments are flawed and why the EEOC’s enforcement
policy is, in fact, consistent with Title VII. But first, I briefly review the new
guidelines and the legal precedent on which the guidelines rely.
I. THE EEOC GUIDELINES
The EEOC’s new guidelines are an off-shoot of its “E-RACE” (Eradicat-
ing Racism and Colorism from Employment) initiative.13 One of the areas
targeted by that initiative for stronger enforcement is “facially neutral employ-
ment criteria” that are “significantly disadvantaging applicants and employees
on the basis of race and color.”14 The EEOC identified the use of arrest and
conviction records as one of these facially neutral employment criteria, and on
April 25, 2012, issued new guidelines for employers on the use of such
records.15
The new EEOC guidelines encourage employers who use criminal records
in employment decisions to review the seriousness of the crime, to consider
how long ago the crime occurred, and to consider how relevant the crime is to
the specific job in question.16 They also discourage bright-line criminal records
policies and instead call for an “individualized assessment” of applicants and
employees.17 Factors to be taken into account include:
• The facts or circumstances surrounding the offense or conduct;
.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323701904578276491630786614 (“Most busi-
nesses perform criminal background checks on job applicants, but the EEOC guidance
frowns on such checks and creates new legal tripwires that could spark federal lawsuits.”);
Peter Kirsanow & Carissa Mulder, The EEOC’s New Rule on Background Checks, NAT’L
REV. ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2013, 7:56 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/338937
/eeocs-new-rule-background-checks-peter-kirsanow (“Despite the profound effect the gui-
dance has on the nation’s employers, the EEOC hurriedly implemented the guidance without
giving the public an adequate opportunity to comment on it.”). In November, the state of
Texas filed a lawsuit against the EEOC in federal court over the guidelines, alleging that
they infringe on state sovereignty. But see Editorial Board, A Second Chance for Ex-Offend-
ers, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at A26.
12 Letter from Patrick Morrisey, W. Va. Attorney Gen., et al., to EEOC Commissioners 2
(July 24, 2013) [hereinafter Attorneys General Letter], available at http://www.wvago.gov
/pdf/2013-7-24,%20EEOC%20(bw).pdf.
13 See The E-RACE Initiative, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
14 Why Do We Need E-RACE?, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/why_e-race.cfm (last visited Apr. 22, 2014).
15 See generally EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 7.
16 Id. at 2, 11, 23.
17 Id. at 18.
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• The number of offenses for which the individual was convicted;
• Older age at the time of conviction, or release from prison;
• Evidence that the individual performed the same type of work, post
conviction, with the same or a different employer, with no known inci-
dents of criminal conduct;
• The length and consistency of employment history before and after the
offense or conduct;
• Rehabilitation efforts, e.g., education/training;
• Employment or character references and any other information regard-
ing fitness for the particular position; and
• Whether the individual is bonded under a federal, state, or local bond-
ing program.18
II. LEGAL THEORY AND PRECEDENT FOR THE GUIDELINES
Currently, there is no federal anti-discrimination law aimed specifically at
protecting ex-offenders. Thus, hope for federal protection against such discrim-
ination currently lies chiefly in Title VII.
Title VII encompasses two main theories of discrimination: disparate
treatment and disparate impact.19 Disparate treatment requires a showing that a
plaintiff or plaintiff class is being intentionally treated unfavorably because of
their race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.20 Disparate impact, on the
other hand, requires no showing of intent. Instead, such a claim arises when a
facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on one of the protected classes.21
Once a plaintiff has proven that the policy has a discriminatory effect, an
employer can defend the policy by showing that it is “job related for the posi-
tion in question and consistent with business necessity.”22 The plaintiff may
then rebut this defense if he or she is able to show that another, less discrimina-
tory policy, which would equally fulfill the business necessity, is available to
employers.23
While an ex-offender might be able to make out a disparate treatment
claim if he or she could show that minority ex-offenders were being treated
differently than non-minority ex-offenders, in practice this is extremely diffi-
cult.24 Disparate impact holds more promise. As noted earlier, the EEOC con-
tends that because of the disproportionate number of African American and
Hispanic men with criminal records, facially neutral policies excluding ex-
offenders from employment may have a disparate impact on these groups.
Precedent supports the EEOC’s reading of Title VII on this issue. The
EEOC’s guidelines are based chiefly on the earliest appellate case addressing
past convictions, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac).25 In
18 Id.
19 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
20 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
21 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
22 Id.
23 Id. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C).
24 See Harwin, supra note 2, at 17.
25 Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). See also EEOC GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, at 2, 11.
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that case, the Eighth Circuit found that MoPac’s policy of denying employment
to anyone who had been convicted of any crime other than a minor traffic
offense had a disparate impact on minorities.26 In finding for the plaintiff, the
court concluded that,
We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every
individual convicted of any offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent
ranks of the unemployed. This is particularly true of blacks who have suffered and
still suffer from the burdens of discrimination in our society. To deny job opportuni-
ties to these individuals because of some conduct which may be remote in time or
does not significantly bear upon the particular job requirements is an unnecessarily
harsh and unjust burden.27
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, the
Eighth Circuit found support in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.28 There,
the defendant argued that it was not excluding the plaintiff because of his race
but because of prior criminal activity directly related to the employer.29 The
court noted that the exclusion was not “through some sweeping disqualification
of all those with any past record of unlawful behavior, however remote, insub-
stantial, or unrelated to applicant’s personal qualifications as an employee.”30
The Eighth Circuit interpreted those remarks to mean that such a sweeping
qualification would violate Title VII if it had a disparate impact and was not
closely related to the job in question.31
Other cases have since supported this reading of Title VII, even when they
were decided in favor of the defendant. For example, in El v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transpotation Authority (SEPTA),32 a bus driver who was
responsible for transporting people with mental and physical disabilities was
terminated due to employer concerns about “public safety” after his forty-
seven-year-old homicide conviction was uncovered.33
Although the court in El decided in favor of the defendant, it did so not
because it disagreed that the policy had a disparate impact on minorities, but
because it found the policy tailored enough to prevent hiring only “those that
. . . have the highest and most unpredictable rates of recidivism and thus pre-
sent the greatest danger to its passengers.”34 While the court did not completely
reject bright-line policies, it said that they were only appropriate when they
“can distinguish between individual applicants that do and do not pose an
acceptable level of risk” and that whether a given policy can do so is a question
of fact.35 The court relied on expert testimony about the types of convictions in
26 See Green, 523 F.2d at 1295.
27 Id. at 1298.
28 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
29 Id. at 806.
30 Id.
31 See Green, 523 F.2d at 1296.
32 El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
33 Id. at 236 (noting that at the time of El’s hiring, SEPTA had a policy barring employment
for anyone convicted of driving under the influence, of a felony or misdemeanor, for a crime
of moral turpitude, or of a violent crime, and that SEPTA also barred employment for other
offenses if they had occurred within the seven years prior to employment).
34 Id. at 243.
35 Id. at 245.
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question and seemed to criticize the plaintiff for not offering contradicting
expert testimony.36 While El may suggest evidentiary challenges for plaintiffs,
it did not question the inherent legitimacy of applying disparate impact theory
in such cases.
More recently, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
denied a school district’s motion to dismiss, holding that the district’s policy of
terminating employees who were found to have certain criminal convictions, no
matter how old the conviction or how related they were to the job in question,
potentially violated Title VII because of its disparate impact.37 In that case, the
school district had imposed the restrictions in compliance with a new state
law.38 Two employees with convictions, one of which was serious, were
fired.39 The court rejected the school district’s business necessity defense, hold-
ing that Title VII trumped state law on the issue40 and that the policy was too
broad because it did not account for the length of time that had passed since the
crimes, the nature of the crimes, or the employees’ good performance at the
jobs in question.41
Against this backdrop, I will now turn to the Attorneys General Letter and
show why the letter’s criticism of the EEOC and the application of Title VII
disparate impact theory in criminal records cases is fundamentally flawed.
III. THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL LETTER
On July 24, 2013, nine state attorneys general sent a letter to the EEOC
criticizing the new guidelines. The letter made a number of arguments that can
be broadly divided into two categories: arguments questioning the EEOC’s
authority and the legitimacy of disparate impact theory, and arguments about
the negative unintended consequences of the new guidelines.42 Although the
EEOC subsequently issued a public response to the letter, the response failed to
address all of the attorneys general’s arguments.43 The rest of this article takes
on each of the arguments in turn and shows why they do not represent a coher-
ent critique of the EEOC’s new guidelines but rather an attack on the agency
itself and some of the very foundations of employment discrimination law
generally.
36 Id. at 246–47.
37 Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
38 Id. at 887.
39 Gregory Waldon had been found guilty of felonious assault in 1977 and imprisoned for
two years. Eartha Britton had been “convicted in 1983 of acting as a go-between in the
purchase and sale of $5.00 of marijuana.” Id. at 886 n.1.
40 Id. at 890. However, Title VII does not trump other federal laws. EEOC GUIDELINES,
supra note 7, at 2.
41 See Waldon, 941 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
42 See generally Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12.
43 Response Letter from U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n to State Attorneys Gen. on
Use of Criminal Background Checks in Employment (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/criminal_background_checks.cfm [hereinafter EEOC
Response Letter].
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IV. ARGUMENTS QUESTIONING THE EEOC’S AUTHORITY AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. Criminal Records Policies Are Not Intended to Discriminate
Arguably the easiest of the attorneys general’s arguments to dispense with
is their argument that criminal records policies do not have a discriminatory
purpose.44 In discussing the two recent lawsuits filed by the EEOC, the letter
notes, “Importantly, neither lawsuit alleges overt racial discrimination or dis-
criminatory intent on the part of the companies . . . . To the contrary, every
individual who fails a criminal background check is equally refused
employment.”45
This argument seems to misunderstand the nature of disparate impact the-
ory. As noted previously, disparate impact does not require a showing of intent.
Rather, disparate impact provides an avenue for combatting discrimination
when facially neutral policies have a discriminatory effect. While disparate
impact did not originally appear in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was quickly
established in the courts.46 As time went on and the courts began to dismantle
this theory of liability, Congress stepped in and codified it in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.47
Criminal records policies are, in fact, a quintessential example of a facially
neutral policy that has a discriminatory effect. Although they are, on their face,
applicable to all races, they operate to exclude disproportionately African
American and Hispanic men from employment opportunities. While it is cer-
tainly possible that some employers use such policies as a hidden mechanism
for discriminating against minorities, such a motivation is in no way required
for a finding of disparate impact.
Given that this distinction is Employment Discrimination Law 101, the
attorneys general presumably knew this when they drafted the letter. Thus, their
critique is really an attack on disparate impact itself. The implication of their
argument is that intent should be required, at least in the particular circum-
stance of criminal records policies. But, in that case, the appropriate venue for
their complaint is Congress, not the EEOC, since the latter is charged with
implementing the law as it currently stands.
B. Criminal Convictions are Often Job-related and Consistent with
Business Necessity
As discussed earlier, a finding of disparate impact does not automatically
render a policy invalid. Instead, if the plaintiff can prove that a given policy has
a discriminatory effect, the employer has the opportunity to show that the pol-
icy is “job-related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity . . . .”48
44 Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12.
45 Id.
46 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–73 (2009) (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)).
47 Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV.
896, 896 (1993).
48 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
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In cases involving criminal records, some courts have treated this require-
ment rather lightly.49 Thus, one of the chief purposes of the EEOC guidelines
seems to be to strengthen this requirement and to make it more difficult to
meet.50 In its guidelines, the EEOC states that, to show business necessity, “the
employer needs to show that the policy operates to effectively link specific
criminal conduct, and its dangers, with the risks inherent in the duties of a
particular position.”51 The guidelines urge employers to make individualized
assessments of each applicant, and state that bright-line screens are only appro-
priate when they are “narrowly tailored to identify criminal conduct with a
demonstrably tight nexus to the position in question.”52
The attorneys general take particular exception to this preference for indi-
vidualized assessment over bright-line rules, stating, “It defies common sense
to suggest that a bright-line criminal conviction screen will only rarely be ‘job
related’ and ‘consistent with business necessity.’ ”53 The letter then presents a
number of reasons why an employer might want to exclude individuals with
criminal histories, including concerns about safety, liability, and trustworthi-
ness.54
However, it is unclear why these employer concerns could not be equally
or better accomplished with individualized assessment rather than bright-line
exclusionary policies. The letter provides only one example—positions in law
enforcement—of jobs “for which the existence of any criminal history could
logically and reasonably be an absolute disqualifier.”55 But this example helps
to show exactly why such bright-line policies are flawed. While law enforce-
ment positions are one of the most obvious examples of a line of work in which
a clean criminal history is “job-related” and “consistent with business neces-
sity,” one can imagine hypothetical applicants who could be unfairly or unnec-
essarily excluded, such as someone who was wrongfully arrested.
In fact, a scenario in which a candidate was at least arguably unfairly
excluded from a position with a police department occurred in Clinkscale v.
City of Philadelphia.56 In that case, the plaintiff was an African-American male
who was employed by the FBI at the time he sought a position with the Phila-
49 See, e.g., Tye v. City of Cincinnati, 794 F. Supp. 824, 833 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (finding that
“public safety” concerns were sufficient justification for not hiring firefighters with criminal
records); EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 752 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(“It is not required that Carolina Freight’s conviction policy be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’
to its business needs.”); Strickland v. Cnty. of Monroe, No. 00-CV-6595L, 2005 WL
1522802, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005) (holding that a twenty-five-year-old assault plea
was “ample justification for refusing to hire a probation officer”); Williams v. Scott, No. 92
C 5747, 1992 WL 229849, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992) (“It really requires nothing more
than the statement of [employer’s] policy to explain its business justification.”).
50 It should be noted that courts are not bound by the EEOC guidelines. Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–42 (1976).
51 EEOC GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 14.
52 Id.
53 Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12, at 3.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Clinkscale v. City of Phila., No. Civ.A. 97-2165, 1998 WL 372138 (E.D. Pa. June 16,
1998).
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delphia Police Department.57 Several years earlier, he had been arrested twice,
once for assaulting a neighbor, and another time for assaulting a police
officer.58 The charges regarding the neighbor were dismissed, and he was
acquitted on the charges regarding the police officer.59 The court agreed that
the latter charge in particular was likely baseless.60 The plaintiff had brought a
civil rights suit against the City of Philadelphia over the matter, which was later
settled, and the plaintiff’s record was expunged.61
The plaintiff challenged the police department’s bright-line policy of
excluding all applicants to the police academy who had arrest records, arguing
that it had a disparate impact on African-Americans.62 The court, however,
held that the policy was justified even if, as seemed likely, the plaintiff was
innocent of the prior charges.63 The court reasoned that “[e]ven an unjustified
arrest may be indicative of character traits that would be undesirable in a police
officer, such as a quick temper, poor attitude or argumentativeness.”64
The Clinkscale case shows precisely why more individualized considera-
tion of applicants and employees is desirable. It seems patently unfair that an
individual would be excluded for life from certain positions based on arrests
that not only did not lead to convictions but that the court acknowledges were
probably not legitimate in the first place. In fact, courts expressed a particular
distaste for bright-line policies against those with arrest records but not convic-
tions as early as 1972 in Gregory v. Litton Systems.65 Given the widely docu-
mented disparity in the number of minority men who have been subjected to
unlawful arrests,66 the Clinkscale Court’s dismissal of those who have been
unjustly arrested as likely having a “poor attitude” seems particularly tone-deaf.
Under the court’s reasoning, someone like Henry Louis Gates, Jr., the esteemed
Harvard scholar who was notoriously arrested as he attempted to enter his own
home,67 would automatically be barred from service.
However, even if one agrees that, in the case of law enforcement officers,
a bright-line exclusionary policy would be appropriate, it is the exception that
57 Id. at *1.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at *2.
64 Id.
65 Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that an
employer’s bright-line policy excluding those with arrest records violated Title VII because
of its disparate impact on African American applicants).
66 Indeed, Judge Fullam, the author of the Clinkscale opinion acknowledged as much, writ-
ing, “I will assume for present purposes that African Americans are indeed more likely than
whites to be arrested; I am even willing to assume that a higher percentage of those arrests
are unjustified.” Clinkscale, 1998 WL 372138, at *1.
67 See Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer Is Accused of Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates
.html?_r=1&. Gates was arrested at his home after a neighbor reported a possible robbery
when his front door jammed, and with assistance of his cab driver, he forced it open. Gates
was reportedly uncooperative when police arrived, thus, perhaps, exhibiting the kind of
“poor attitude” that the Clinkscale Court deems disqualifies from police service even those
who are unjustly arrested. Id.
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proves the rule. If there is one category of work for which a prior criminal
history could make one unfit, that category is criminal justice enforcement. The
obvious nexus between the lack of a criminal history and the enforcement of
criminal law serves to illustrate how poor that fit is in other categories of jobs.
Why, for example, should a DUI received when one was twenty-one years old
translate into untrustworthiness for, say, a cashier position when one is twenty-
seven?
Furthermore, the fact that the EEOC favors individualized assessments
does not rule out bright-line exclusionary policies entirely.68 While excluding
someone from a cashier position for a six-year-old DUI would be onerous, a
bright-line exclusion based on convictions for theft might be more reasonable,
at least so long as the exclusion is time-limited. The limitation on bright-line
rules is thus not one of eliminating their existence entirely but of eliminating
overly broad rules that exclude huge categories of individuals whose prior
criminal history has absolutely nothing to do with the particular job in question
or who that person is today.
C. The EEOC is Attempting to Create a New Protected Class
Another argument that the attorneys general made is that the “true pur-
pose” of the enforcement guidelines is not to correctly enforce Title VII “but
rather the illegitimate expansion of Title VII protection to former criminals.”69
The letter essentially argues that the enforcement guidelines are creating a new
protected class––former criminals––under the pretext of preventing racial dis-
crimination.70 The support the attorneys general offer for this argument is
unclear, but it seems to rest chiefly on the fact that the hypothetical examples
the EEOC provides for practices that may violate Title VII do not focus heavily
on the race of the hypothetical employees.71
Nonetheless, this argument merits further attention because it is probably
the most obvious critique of using disparate impact theory to reduce employers’
reliance on bright-line criminal records exclusionary policies. In fact, as the
letter writers noted, this critique was made by the dissenting opinion in Green
itself, which stated, “In effect, the present case has judicially created a new
Title VII protected class––persons with conviction records. This extension, if
wise, is a legislative responsibility and should not be done under the guise of
racial discrimination.”72
On its face, the application of disparate impact theory to those with crimi-
nal records does seem uncomfortable. Paradoxically, this is because the need
for some kind of anti-discrimination protection for those with criminal records
is so pressing. The major public policy concerns arising from the difficulty of
re-integrating those with criminal records into society combined with the lack
68 EEOC Response Letter, supra note 43.
69 Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12, at 3.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 4 (“Your real target appears to be the perceived unfairness of judging an individ-
ual—of any race—solely by his or her past criminal behavior. That is the focus of the
hypotheticals discussed in your guidance document.”).
72 Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1300 (8th Cir. 1975) (Gibson, C.J.,
dissenting).
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of meaningful direct legal remedies makes the argument that the goal of re-
integration is being served indirectly by tying it to race seem plausible.
Nonetheless, the possibility that the EEOC’s guidelines might serve
another policy goal beyond alleviating discrimination against Title VII’s enu-
merated protected classes cannot make the guidelines an illegitimate use of
power unless they do not also serve to alleviate discrimination against one of
the protected classes. Given the massive disproportionality in the racial compo-
sition of those with criminal records, this simply is not the case.73 The fact that
criminal records exclusionary policies will almost invariably disproportionately
impact African American and Hispanic men means that the goal of alleviating
discrimination against those with criminal records cannot be severed from the
goal of alleviating race discrimination. Any discussion of the harmful effect on
society and individuals of the problem of ex-offender re-entry would be mean-
ingless without a discussion of race.
Furthermore, the argument that the EEOC is attempting to create a new
protected class could be leveled against virtually all uses of disparate impact
theory. Striking down minimum height restrictions could be read as not protect-
ing women but as protecting short people.74 Similarly, striking down minimum
weight requirements could be read as protecting thin people.75 Even Griggs v.
Duke Power Company, the seminal disparate impact case, could fall under this
criticism; instead of protecting against racial discrimination, it could be argued
that disparate impact theory was creating a new protected class for those with-
out high school diplomas.76
Thus, the argument that using disparate impact theory in criminal records
exclusion cases is creating a new protected class is a red herring for an attack
on the very validity of disparate impact theory itself. Disparate impact cases
will, almost invariably, protect specific subsets of protected classes rather than
the class as a whole. In the cases mentioned above, protection was extended not
to all women, but to women who were under a certain height or weight and not
to all African-Americans but to those who did not have high school diplomas.
Similarly, restrictions on the use of criminal records do not protect all members
of given races but only those with criminal records. That disparate impact cases
may, in some situations, have the side effect of implementing policy goals that
go beyond the scope of Title VII does not negate their validity.
D. Racial Prejudice in the Criminal Justice System is Better Fixed in More
Direct Ways
As part of their accusation that the EEOC’s new enforcement guidelines
are not actually aimed at alleviating racial prejudice, the attorneys general
noted that “if there is truly a concern about racial prejudice in the criminal
73 Simonson, supra note 5, at 284–85.
74 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323–24, 331–32 (1977) (holding that a prison’s
minimum height and weight restrictions for prison guards violated Title VII because of the
restrictions’ disparate impact on women).
75 Id.
76 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that a facially neutral
policy requiring employees for certain positions to have high school diplomas and pass intel-
ligence tests violated Title VII because of its disparate impact on African-Americans).
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justice system, there are more direct ways to reform that system than using
federal dollars to compel employers to hire convicted criminals.”77 The logic
behind this argument seems to be that because using Title VII in these types of
cases is not the most effective means of alleviating racial injustice, it must be
an illegitimate means.
Once again, this argument is ill-founded. No doubt, racial prejudice in the
criminal justice system requires a far more comprehensive solution than dispa-
rate impact theory can provide. Indeed, one could argue that if disparate impact
theory were being used as the chief method to fix that wider problem, it ought
to be abandoned in these cases—not because it is an illegitimate use of power
but because it would risk providing a post hoc band-aid for a situation that
requires major surgery.
But the EEOC is, of course, not tasked with reforming the criminal justice
system. Rather, it is tasked with enforcing Title VII. The racial imbalance in the
criminal justice system means that criminal background exclusionary policies
in employment necessarily implicate the employment opportunities of certain
protected classes under Title VII. And ensuring that such employment opportu-
nities are available is precisely what the EEOC is tasked with accomplishing.
E. Interference with State Sovereignty
Finally, the attorneys general argued that the new EEOC guidelines
represent an “intrusion into state sovereignty [that is] particularly egregious.”78
The letter states, “[t]he guidance document purports to supersede state and local
hiring laws that impose bright-line criminal background restrictions that are not
narrowly tailored.”79 The letter then provides several examples of state laws
barring convicted felons from certain occupations that could be in danger if
disparate impact cases are successful.80
Again, this argument has some validity. In fact, as noted previously, a
recent federal case in Ohio held that obeying state law was not a legitimate
business necessity where the law required employers to enact policies that vio-
lated Title VII.81
Nonetheless, this argument, like the argument asserting that the EEOC is
attempting to create a new protected class, goes deeper than a qualm with these
particular EEOC guidelines. Because, of course, the guidelines did not create
the concept of federal pre-emption; Title VII has always pre-empted state law
when it requires or permits unlawful employment practices.82 The guidelines
do not add anything new to the law; instead, they clarify rules that have been in
effect for decades and represent a renewed commitment to enforcing those
rules. Thus, even if the attorneys general are correct in their assessment that,
under the guidelines, a multitude of state laws could be declared illegitimate,
they are incorrect in their assessment that it is the guidelines themselves that
77 Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12, at 4.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. The letter cites several West Virginia state laws barring felons from employment in
occupations such as owning a pain management clinic or serving as a municipal judge.
81 Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2012).
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would cause the illegitimacy. If the laws they cite and others are found to vio-
late Title VII, it will be because they always violated Title VII, not because the
EEOC has changed the rules.
V. ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE NEGATIVE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW GUIDELINES
A. Individualized Consideration Will Actually Lead to More Racism
In furtherance of their accusation that the EEOC’s new enforcement
guidelines are not actually aimed at alleviating racial prejudice, the attorneys
general also argue that “the individualized consideration that [the EEOC] advo-
cates would create far more opportunity for racial discrimination than the non-
discretionary screening processes allegedly used by the companies.”83
Although the letter does not elaborate on this argument, one can surmise that
the underlying theory is that asking employers to evaluate individuals on a
case-by-case basis might have the unintended consequence of increasing racial
discrimination because employers will be more likely to overlook the criminal
record of a white applicant or employee than that of an African American or
Hispanic applicant or employee.
This argument, cynical as it may be, is not entirely without support.
Indeed, at least one study has shown that white applicants with criminal records
fare about the same as African American applicants without criminal records.84
African American applicants with criminal records, of course, fare the worst.85
Still this argument actually shows just how necessary protections for those
with criminal backgrounds are to ensuring racial equality in employment. Con-
trary to the letter’s underlying thesis that criminal records policies and race are
totally unconnected, this argument shows that the letter writers are well aware
of the unintentional discrimination arising from the association of certain
minorities with criminality and other undesirable characteristics.86 This argu-
ment shows that even the letter writers believe that, if left to their own devices,
employers will make unlawful distinctions between applicants and employees.
If this is the case, it belies the letter’s earlier claim that criminal records
exclusionary policies are rational, fair means of determining one’s qualification
for employment. If the exclusions were all truly “job-related” and “consistent
with business necessity,” then there would be little worry that knowing the race
of the applicant or employee would change the outcome of the employment
decision. Rather, it is precisely because the current exclusions are overly broad
83 Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12, at 3–4.
84 Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 617,
644–45 (2005) (describing the results of a study in which black and white testers with equal
qualifications but varying criminal records applied for low-level jobs: “Among blacks with-
out criminal records, only 14 [percent] received callbacks relative to 34 [percent] of white
noncriminals. In fact, even whites with criminal records (17 [percent]) received more
favorable treatment than blacks without criminal records (14 [percent]”).
85 Id. at 642. (“While the ratio of callbacks for nonoffenders relative to offenders for whites
was two to one, this same ratio for blacks is close to three to one.”).
86 L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2044–45 (2011) (describing several studies indicating unconscious associations of
African American men with danger and criminality).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ310.txt unknown Seq: 14  4-JUN-14 7:29
Summer 2014] DEFYING “COMMON SENSE?” 783
that individualized consideration presents a risk. Broad exclusionary policies
could almost be read as a kind of self-insurance for the employers; by exclud-
ing a large group of people blindly, they avoid the risk of excluding individuals
based on protected characteristics.
But the fact that unconscious bias leads some employers, even those with
the best intentions, to discriminate is a reason to provide more protection, not
less. Policies that violate Title VII under disparate impact theory ought not be
justified as preventative measures against disparate treatment liability.
B. Cost to Business is Prohibitive
Lastly, the letter argues that the individualized assessment recommended
in the EEOC’s guidelines will “add significant costs” to businesses.87 The letter
states, “Employers will have to spend more time and money evaluating appli-
cants that they would not have previously considered due to their criminal his-
tory and, in many cases, are unlikely to hire even after a more thorough
vetting.”88
The letter does not offer any evidence for this proposition, and it is unclear
whether it is true. The guidelines do not require employers to interview more
candidates for any given job; indeed, as noted earlier, they do not even require
employers to forgo bright line rules entirely. This latter point particularly bears
repeating because employers seeking to save time and money while staying
within the bounds of the law might begin by narrowing their policies to include
only those bright-line restrictions that are obviously tied to the job in question.
For example, few would doubt that a year-old conviction for a DUI ought to
preclude someone from a job as a delivery driver; but a ten-year-old conviction
for vandalism does not bear a cognizable relationship to that same job or, for
that matter, provide any other information than that, ten years ago, the person in
question acted foolishly on at least one occasion. Thus, the appropriate remedy
for avoiding excessive costs in both time and money is not the overkill of broad
exclusionary policies but to tailor the requirement up front.
But perhaps the attorneys general’s true concerns about time and money
are best revealed in their statement that “more individualized assessments are
liable to increase the number of discrimination suits by rejected applicants and,
in turn, employers’ litigation expenses.”89 This is probably true. If the attorneys
general’s assessment that employers are more likely to discriminate based on
race when presented with individual cases is accurate, then they are also likely
correct that such individual assessment will probably lead to more disparate
treatment lawsuits.
Nonetheless, if, as the letter writers themselves predict, employers do not
view white and black applicants with the same criminal records in the same
way, that is all the more reason why Title VII is implicated in criminal records
cases. The letter accuses the EEOC of using race as a proxy for assisting ex-
convicts. But it could be equally true that employers are currently using ex-
87 Attorneys General Letter, supra note 12, at 4.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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convict status as a proxy for discriminating based on race.90 At the very least,
as noted previously, risking disparate impact liability ought not to be an insur-
ance measure against avoiding disparate treatment liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this article has shown, the attorneys general’s arguments, as articulated
in their letter to the EEOC, against the use of disparate impact theory to allevi-
ate a particularly prevalent form of discrimination are misguided and, in some
cases, illogical. While there may be some legitimate reasons for treating crimi-
nal records differently than other types of facially neutral policies, the attorneys
general’s letter does not present them. Instead, the letter is an indirect attack on
the authority of the EEOC and the legitimacy of disparate impact theory. These
are critiques best taken up with Congress, but as the law currently stands, they
represent little more than a desire that the EEOC stop properly enforcing Title
VII.
90 See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 11 (2013).
